What Scripture says
Scripture doesn’t hide from evil. It opens with a good creation spoiled by human rebellion (Genesis 1–3, ESV), and its writers repeatedly ask why the wicked prosper and the innocent suffer (Psalm 73, Habakkuk 1:2–4, Job). It affirms both that God is good (“The Lord is good to all”, Psalm 145:9) and all-powerful (“nothing will be impossible with God”, Luke 1:37), and that evil is real and will be defeated (Revelation 21:4).
It also shows God bringing good out of evil: Joseph tells his brothers, “you meant evil against me, but God meant it for good” (Genesis 50:20), and the worst evil of all, the crucifixion, became the means of salvation (Acts 2:23–24).
What the evidence says
Philosophy
Two versions of the argument
| Version | Claim | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Logical problem | God and evil are logically contradictory; both can’t exist | Widely considered refuted |
| Evidential problem | The amount and kind of evil make God unlikely | Still actively debated |
The logical problem
The classic form goes back to Epicurus, as reported by later writers, and was put sharply by J. L. Mackie in 1955:
- If God is all-powerful, he can prevent evil.
- If God is wholly good, he wants to prevent evil.
- Yet evil exists.
- So an all-powerful, wholly good God doesn’t exist.
The argument needs a hidden premise: that a good God would always prevent evil, whatever the cost. But a good being might allow evil if it had a good reason, for example, if preventing it would mean losing a greater good.
Plantinga’s free will defence
In 1974, the philosopher Alvin Plantinga argued that it is possible that:
- A world with creatures who are genuinely free, and who freely do good, is more valuable than a world of robots.
- God can’t make free creatures always choose good, since then they wouldn’t be free.
- So it is possible that God couldn’t create a world with free creatures and no evil.
Plantinga didn’t claim to show God’s actual reasons, only that there is no contradiction. That was enough to defeat the logical argument. Most philosophers, including atheists, now agree. William Rowe, an atheist, wrote that “granted incompatibilism, there is a fairly compelling argument for the view that the existence of evil is logically consistent with the existence of the theistic God”. Even Mackie conceded in 1982 that the problem doesn’t show that the central doctrines of theism are logically inconsistent.
The evidential problem
Most atheist philosophers now argue differently: not that God and evil are impossible together, but that the amount of evil, especially apparently pointless suffering, makes God unlikely. William Rowe’s example is a fawn burned in a forest fire, suffering for days with no one to see it. What good could that serve?
Responses include:
- Our limited view. If God exists, we would expect him to have reasons beyond our understanding, as a child can’t understand why a parent allows a painful vaccination. This is sometimes called skeptical theism.
- The rest of the evidence. Evil must be weighed against other evidence for God, such as the origin of the universe and moral truth (see 1.1–1.5).
- Evil assumes good. Calling something truly evil assumes a real moral standard, which itself may point to God (see 1.5).
This is a real argument, discussed under 9.2.
Where they meet
Evil doesn’t prove God doesn’t exist. The logical form of the argument fails, as most philosophers agree. The question of why God allows so much suffering remains hard (see 9.2).
What’s still open
The evidential problem: whether the amount and kind of suffering makes God improbable.
Bottom line
No. Most philosophers, including atheists, accept that the logical version of this argument fails: God and evil aren’t contradictory if God has good reasons, such as free will. This is rated Settled.